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CASE NOTES
establish liability on promises 6 to be based on three rules that are controlled
by such words as substantial, forseeable, reasonable, actual, and injustice. Corbin
presents a good argument in stating that the courts are already familiar with
such terms and their application. 7 Nevertheless, it is understandable that they
should be somewhat jealous of a rule that is relatively simple to apply, and
which works justice in the majority of cases.
As yet, the Illinois courts have not been called upon to apply the doctrine of
promissory estoppel to a commercial case.
To conclude, it is probably a fair appraisal of this case to say the New Jersey
court has taken a step toward joining the many states that while adhering to the
doctrine of consideration pay some recognition to the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.
16 1 Williston, Contracts § 139 (rev. ed., 1936).
17 1 Corbin, Contracts § 200 (1950).
CRIMINAL LAW-JURORS READING NEWSPAPER ACCOUNT
OF PRIOR ACTS OF DEFENDANT HELD ERROR
The defendant was convicted of rape and given a life sentence. Sixteen years
later, under the subsequently passed Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,' the
defendant filed a petition for relief alleging a substantial denial of his constitu-
tional rights. The Criminal Court of Cook County granted a new trial, holding
that because the jury had been allowed to read prejudicial newspaper articles
concerning the defendant during the trial, his right to a fair and impartial trial
was impaired. It was alleged and not denied that the prosecuting attorney re-
leased the story. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, three justices dissenting,
holding that where all of the jurors were allowed to read, on the evening before
they were to render their verdict, that the defendant had confessed to two
murders, had boasted of attacking more than fifty women, had been referred to
by the police as a "vicious degenerate" and had been arrested while attempting
to attack another woman, it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny
the defendant's motion to withdraw a juror. The court so held notwithstanding
the jurors' affirmances that they could and would disregard what they had read
and notwithstanding the court's instructions to that effect. People v. Hryciuk,
5 Ill. 2d 176, 125 N.E. 2d 61 (1954).
The majority of decisions support the view that a mistrial is warranted only if
the reading of the prejudicial matter appears to actually have the effect of influ-
encing a juror's decision, and this determination is vested with the trial court.'
The effect of reading a prejudicial article may be mitigated by showing that the
1I11. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 38, §§ 826-832.
'People v. Herbert, 340 II1. 320, 172 N.E. 740 (1930); Collins v. Dunbar, 131 Me. 337,
162 At. 897 (1932).
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jury was not influencedby th' article and by also showing that instructions by
the court were given to disregard the contents of the article. On the jurors'
affirmance that they have not been influenced and that they will disregard the
prejudicial matter and return a fair and impartial verdict, a new trial, mistrial,
or reversal is generally denied. Thus, in United States v. Pisano,8 a misleading
report was read by the jurors during the course of the trial. On inquiry the
jurors indicated that they would not be influenced and the court instructed them
to discontinue reading reports of the case and to disregard what theyhad already
read. On review, the court held that the action taken was appropriate and the
"purity" of the trial was not destroyed.
People v. Murawski,4 cited and discussed at length in the majority opinion,
indicates the Illinois court's reasoning on the effect of instructions as a mitigat-
ing agency though the doctrine that the prejudicial effect of a news story can in
all cases be removed by instructions has never been adopted. That was an
abortion trial where the court concluded that the record showed that at least
some jurors read a newspaper account pointing out the defendant's prior in-
dictment for abortion. The jurors were not given any instructions to disregard
the contents of the article. On appeal, a mistrial was declared. The inference is
apparent that if precautionary instructions were given, the effect of the preju-
dicial matter could have been overcome, though the majority did not comment
on it. In line with the majority view, Illinois has permitted a juror to say he has
not been influenced by reading prejudicial articles. In People v. Mangano,5 in
view of this disavowal, a mistrial was not declared.
The test of whether a new trial, mistrial or reversal is in order on the occa-
sion of a juror's reading prejudicial reports has been said to be whether or not
a fair and impartial trial has been prevented.' This determination necessarily is
centered around the fact situation in each case. The majority in the instant case
commenting on the point said:
A determination of this question involves the court's consideration of all facts and
circumstances and conjecturing upon the effect that the incompetent information has had
upon the minds of the jurors, a determination incapable of absolute accuracy or a very
high degree of reliability3
The majority of the courts rely heavily on the jurors' statements that they will
be fair and impartial, apparently proceeding on the premise that the juror's own
decision as to the article's influence on him will be more accurate than conjec-
ture by the court.' In the instant case, the court said that to regard the jurors'
statements as conclusive would be to overlook the real issue.
3 193 F. 2d 355 (C.A. 7th, 1951).
4 394 I11. 236, 68 N.E. 2d 272 (1946).
6 354 Il1. 329, 188 N.E. 475 (1933).
eState v. Pierce, 178 Ia. 417, 159 N.V. 1050, 1056 (1916).
7 People v. Hryciuk, 5 111. 2d 176, 183, 125 N.E. 2d 61, 65 (1954).
8 Marrin v. United States, 167 Fed. 951, 953 (C.A. 3d, 1909).
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A few courts have adopted the approach taken by the court in the instant
case. The showing of no conscious influence by the jurors' affidavits was held
in State v. Caine9 to be insufficient to mitigate the effect of reading a long and
sensational account of the proceedings in the trial, though the court considered
them generally unobjectionable. The court said:
The unconscious influence of such accounts would be far more likely to effect the
result than an influence of which they were conscious and which they might the more
readily resist. 10
Again, in Commonwealth v. Jacques" the unconscious influence which might be
had was controlling. In this case all of the defendant's witnesses were credited
with prison records in a newspaper account. At least two decisions have held
that a verdict is vitiated where there was a mere possibility of prejudice. 2
The minority adhering to the above theory place the most controlling em-
phasis on the nature of the prejudicial article. In the instant case, the court con-
sidering that the article reported that the defendant had confessed to two mur-
ders and more than fifty criminal attacks on women and therein was described
as a "vicious degenerate" and arrested in another criminal attempt said it would
be a "violent assumption" to conclude that a jury could ignore their emotions
and render a verdict without any conscious or unconscious prejudice. Mere
recitation that the defendant has committed prior crimes is not the sole dis-
tinguishing feature, however. 3
A particularly cogent argument advanced by the dissent and one not con-
sidered by the majority in its opinion is the prevailing rule that where the evi-
dence is such as the jury could not have honestly or intelligently returned any
other verdict a new trial will not be granted, though the jurors had read prejudi-
cial accounts.14 In the instant case, the defendant confessed to raping the prose-
cutrix, leaving no doubt as to his guilt. He was identified by the victim and he,
thereafter, confessed again. The dissent concluded that adequate and convincing
proof of the defendant's guilt was placed before the jury and the verdict re-
turned was the only one that could have been "honestly and intelligently"
returned.
In summary, the instant case characterizes a liberal Illinois view where con-
stitutional rights are involved. The nature of the article is controlling. Appar-
ently of nominal importance are the jurors' affidavits, the court's instructions
and the manifestly just verdict.
9 134 Ia. 147, 111 NW. 443 (1907).
10 Ibid., at 156 and 446. n 1 Pa. Dist. 287 (1892).
2 State v. Barille, 111 W.Va. 567, 163 S.E. 49 (1932); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 5 Pa.
Co. 236 (1887).
"
3State v. Cunningham, 173 Ore. 25, 144 P. 2d 303 (1943); People v. Lubin, 190 App.
Div. 339, 179 N.Y. Supp. 691 (1st Dept., 1920).
14 State v.Williams, 96 Minn. 351, 105 N.W. 265 (1905); State v. Barille, 111 W.Va. 567,
163 S.E. 49 (1932); Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 13 Erie Co. L.J. 126.
